(ADD7) Report of The Independent Inquiry Into The Actions of The United Nations During The 1994 Genocide in Rwanda

ข่าวทั่วไป Friday December 17, 1999 12:43 —PRESS RELEASE LOCAL

11. Failure to protect political leaders
UNAMIR was tasked with the protection of a number of politicians who were of key importance to the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. Moderate and opposition politicians quickly became targets as violence started after the crash of the Presidential plane. Some of them were saved, among them the Prime Minister Designate, Mr Twagiramungu. A number of others, however, were killed by members of the Presidential Guards and elements of the Rwandese army. Among those murdered were the Prime Minister, Mrs Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the leader of the Liberal Party, Mr Landoald Ndasingwa and the former Foreign Minister Mr Boniface Ngulinzira. The President of the Constitutional Court, Mr Joseph Kavaruganda, was taken away by armed elements of the Rwandese army and was never seen again. In these cases, UNAMIR did not succeed in providing the protection these personalities required.
In the case of the Prime Minister, the troops protecting did not to accompany her when she fled across the wall to the UNV compound. As has been described above, the troops surrendered their arms and were taken by the RGF to Camp Kigali, where they were subsequently brutally murdered. According to the family of Ndasingwa, the guards outside his home fled when soldiers of the Presidential Guards arrived at the house. Mr Ndasingwa, his wife, children and mother were all shot. And the family of Kavaruganda said that the guards outside his home did nothing to stop Rwandan soldiers from taking him away, or from beating members of his family, who subsequently fled. Finally, in the case of Ngulinzira, his family reproaches UNAMIR that the United Nations guards protecting him took him and his family to ETO. He was killed in the massacres that followed the Belgian contingent's evacuation of the school.
There is a pattern to these events which shows a failure by UNAMIR troops to guarantee the protection to these political personalities that they had been assured and expected. It is regrettable that not more could be done to resist the attacks by the Presidential Guards and other extremist elements against these politicians. As mentioned above, the Rules of Engagement which governed the mission permitted the use of force in self-defence, as well as action to prevent crimes against humanity. On the other hand, it must be recognized that the extremist forces had had time to observe the strength of the UNAMIR guard posts and overwhelm them with larger force.
The tragic killing of the Belgian peacekeepers also shows a number of problems in UNAMIR's capacity to deal with a crisis situation. When there were reports that the peacekeepers guarding the Prime Minister were in trouble, sufficiently decisive action was not taken by UNAMIR to determine what had happened and to prevent the killings. The Force Commander stated that, passing by Camp Kigali and seeing Belgian peacekeepers on the ground, he was unable to get the RGF driver of his car to stop. The Sector Commander for Kigali said that he did not know about the death of the Belgian paratroopers until 22.00. Although the Force Commander was prevented from reaching the Belgian group at that point, it is a matter of concern that the communications between the different elements of UNAMIR did not seem to ensure a correct flow of information about the threat to the Belgians, and that no-one was able to investigate the fate of the paratroopers until after they were dead.
The failure in these instances seems to be attributable in some instances to a lack of direction from UNAMIR Headquarters, but also to the peacekeepers themselves, who by not resisting the threat to the persons they were protecting in some of the cases outlined above, as would have been covered by their Rules of Engagement, showed a lack of resolve to fulfil their mission.
12. Failure to protect civilians
The role of UNAMIR in the protection of civilians during the genocide is one of the most debated and painful issues of this period. Considerable efforts were made by members of UNAMIR, sometimes at risk to themselves, to provide protection to civilians at risk during the massacres. However, there do not seem to have been conscious and consistent orders down the chain of command on this issue. During the early days of the genocide, thousands of civilians congregated in places where UN troops were stationed, i.a., the Amahoro Stadium and the Ecole Technique at Kicukiro. And when UNAMIR later came to withdraw from areas under its protection, civilians were placed at risk. Tragically, there is evidence that in certain instances, the trust placed in UNAMIR by civilians left them in a situation of greater risk when the UN troops withdrew than they would have been otherwise.
According to the Force Commander and the Deputy Force Commander, the order to evacuate was not given by UNAMIR Headquarters. The order would seem to have been taken by the Belgian command within UNAMIR. There is no doubt that the decision to evacuate the school, leaving thousands of refugees behind at the mercy of the waiting forces of the Interahamwe, is one which has caused enormous pain to the Rwandan people, in particular the survivors of the genocide. The perception that the UN knowingly abandoned a group of civilians has damaged trust in the United Nations severely.
When the UNAMIR contingent at ETO left, there could not have been any doubt as to the risk of massacre which awaited the civilians who had taken refuge with them. Indeed, the Interahamwe and the RGF had for days been stationed outside the school. The manner in which the troops left, including attempts to pretend to the refugees that they were not in fact leaving, was disgraceful. If such a momentous decision as that to evacuate the ETO school was taken without orders from the Force Commander, that shows grave problems of command and control within UNAMIR.
The Inquiry notes that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda recently convicted Mr Georges Rutaganda of genocide and sentenced him to life imprisonment, i.a. for his role in the assault on ETO.
13. Failure to protect national staff
It is a tragic aspect of modern conflict that United Nations and associated as well as other humanitarian personnel are increasingly the targets of violence during armed conflict. The genocide in Rwanda took its toll among the personnel of the United Nations: fourteen peacekeepers and a number of local civilian staff were brutally killed. The efforts to strengthen the protection of United Nations and associated personnel since 1994 have been most encouraging, but more could still be done, not least in order to broaden the scope of the protection afforded by the United Nations convention on this subject.
The Inquiry met with several persons who were members of the national staff of the United Nations in Rwanda at the time of the genocide. When the international civilian staff of the United Nations were evacuated, national staff were left behind. There is considerable bitterness among the national staff at what is perceived as a double standard within the United Nations as to the safety of different groups of staff members. It was even alleged that United Nations staff members may have been at greater risk than others as a result of their employment with the organisation. The United Nations regulations at the time precluded the evacuation of national staff. While the decisions taken at the time may have been in conformity with United Nations regulations, there can be no doubt of the damage caused by these rules to the trust between members of staff. The Inquiry feels that the subsequent change in staff regulations permitting the relocation within the country of national staff is a positive step, but also feels that it is necessary to look actively at the possibility of providing for evacuation in cases where relocation may be a less preferable option. It goes without saying that each staff member, international or national, must know precisely what protection can be expected in times of crisis. The mistaken perception among national staff members in Rwanda that the United Nations would and could protect them shows that a serious failure on the part of those in charge of security - in particular the Special Representative and the designated security official - to provide correct information to staff members.
14. Flow of information
The flow of information between the field and the Secretariat took place at several levels. Code cables were sent either from the Special Representative or the Force Commander, addressed to the Secretary-General, to the Heads of Department concerned, mainly Annan as head of DPKO and Jonah or Goulding, as heads of DPA, or to Baril. Cables from Headquarters were normally signed either by the Head of Department, or in some cases by the Military Adviser, Chief of Staff of the Secretary-General or by his Special Representative to the Security Council. Cables from Annan were in practice often signed off by his deputy, Riza, who carried day-to-day responsibility for UNAMIR within DPKO. Code cables were at times sent with a restriction on distribution, labelled "only" for certain recipients. In addition to code cables, other correspondence was conducted by open fax. Written communication was regularly complemented by telephone conversations, on the substance of which there is little written record in the archives.
By the time of the Rwanda crisis, the Secretary-General had decided that he would be represented in the Security Council by a Special Representative. The Secretary-General himself rarely attended the consultations of the Security Council. Ambassador Gharekhan was appointed as Mr Boutros-Ghali's Special Representative on the Council. Gharekhan was tasked with briefing the Council on behalf of the Secretary-General on the full range of topics on the Council's agenda, often based on speaking notes prepared by the substantive departments concerned. These departments were normally not represented at the consultations of the whole. In addition to the material provided by the departments, Gharekhan informed the Inquiry that he regularly was in direct contact by telephone with the Special Representatives or the Force Commanders of missions on which he was about to brief the Council. While this procedure would have provided Gharekhan the opportunity for a direct exchange of views with the field, from an institutional point of view this procedure excluded those responsible for the daily substantive work on issues discussed in the Council. The lack of direct contact between the substantive departments concerned and the Security Council created a disconnect which had a negative effect on the quality of the information provided to the Security Council, and must have made the understanding of substantive officers in the Secretariat of the deliberations of the Council much more difficult. Representatives of several Members of the Security Council whom the Inquiry has interviewed have complained that the quality of information from the Secretariat was not good enough. It should also be said that more could have been done by those Member States with in-depth knowledge of the situation in Rwanda to share information with the Secretariat.
There were problems in the flow of information from the field to Headquarters. UNAMIR presented a series of deeply worrying reports which together amounted to considerable warnings that the situation in Rwanda could explode into ethnic violence. In sum, information was available - to UNAMIR; United Nations Headquarters and to key Governments - about a strategy and threat to exterminate Tutsis, recurrent ethnic and political killings or an organised nature, deathlists, persistent reports of import and distribution of weapons to the population and hate propaganda. That more was not done to follow-up on this information and respond to it at an early stage was a costly failure: by United Nations Headquarters and UNAMIR but also by the Governments which were kept informed by UNAMIR, in particular those of Belgium, France and the United States. The lack of determined action to deal with the Dallaire cable is only part of this wider picture of failed response to early warning. Also, the fact that the United Nations was in close contact with certain key governments about this information does not change the fact that it should consistently and in equal detail have been brought to the attention of the whole Security Council.
15. Organizational problems
Organizational problems existed both within UNAMIR and within Headquarters which affected the capacity of the United Nations to respond to the events in Rwanda.
Within UNAMIR, it is clear that there were problems in the relationship between Booh Booh and Dallaire. The difficulties were known to the Department heads in New York, who did not however intervene. The difficulties may in part be traced to the fact that the Force Commander arrived first in the mission area and was the person to set up UNAMIR to begin with. Much later on, when the genocide began, their respective roles do not seem to have been clear. UNAMIR seems to have suffered from a lack of political leadership on the part of the Special Representative, but also from problems with regard to the military leadership because of the multitude of tasks the Force Commander had to cover during those first chaotic days. The archives of the mission also show that internal cooperation was problematic in key areas, one example being the difficulties in the cooperation between Booh Booh and his office and the Chief Administrative Officer, Mr Hallqvist, who resigned after a few months in service.
The relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council is a unique feature of the Charter of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has the opportunity, but also the responsibility, to bring to the attention of the Council issues which require action. The Secretary-General can have a decisive influence on decision-making in the Council, and has the capacity to mobilize political will among the membership on key issues on the agenda. Boutros-Ghali was absent from New York during much of the key period of the genocide. The Inquiry understands that Secretaries-General cannot be present at every meeting of the Security Council. The archives show almost daily cables informing the Secretary-General of the unfolding events in Kigali and Headquarters related to Rwanda, and sometimes replies to Headquarters with comments by the Secretary-General. The Inquiry concludes that the Secretary-General was kept informed of key developments in Rwanda. However, the role of the Secretary-General in relation to the Council in true crisis situations such as that of the Rwandan genocide, is one which can only to a limited extent be performed by proxy. Without the opportunity of direct personal contacts between the Secretary-General and the Security Council as a whole, and with its members, the role of the Secretary-General in influencing Council decision-making cannot be as effective or powerful as if he were present.
16. National evacuations: international troops in different roles
The rapid deployment of the national contingents to evacuate expatriates from Kigali saved lives among the expatriate community. Nonetheless, the lack of coordination on the ground with the United Nations before the operations is a matter of concern. The leadership of UNAMIR, or of the Secretariat, should have been better informed about the evacuations being planned.
The rapidity of the response, whereby the French operation was dispatched within hours of the shooting down of the aircraft, also shows a disconnect in the analysis of the situation between these key Member States of the United Nations and UNAMIR. Immediately upon receipt of the information about the crash, France, Belgium, US and Italy evidently believed the situation to be so volatile as to warrant immediate evacuation of their nationals. During these first hours after the crash, UNAMIR was still struggling to identify the nature of what had happened, and to establish basic communication among its own units.
One particular element of concern to the Inquiry is the different roles played by Belgian troops during these crucial hours. The Belgian contingent was still the best equipped and strongest of UNAMIR. The arrival of Belgian national troops blurred the perception of the Kibat contingent. Dallaire also stated to the Inquiry that the Belgian troops within UNAMIR also began taking orders from, and sharing materiel, with the evacuation force. This undermined the capacity of UNAMIR to act in the early days of the genocide.
17. Operation Turquoise
The French-led mission named Operation Turquoise was a mission conducted with the authorisation of the Security Council although not under United Nations command. The Inquiry will limit its analysis of Operation Turquoise to those elements specifically relevant to its mandate: the role of the United Nations during the period until July 1994.
Views diverge as to the effectiveness of the operation in saving the lives of those at risk within the humanitarian zone. Many of Inquiry's interlocutors have credited Operation Turquoise with saving a number of lives in a situation where few other initiatives were being taken to do so, although concerns were also expressed about a number of difficult issues of principle, i.a. with respect to the Operation's relationship to the United Nations. The decision to authorize the operation was not a unanimous one, and considerable concerns were voiced about the mission by those five members of the Council which abstained.
Like the rapid deployment of national evacuation forces, the sudden availability of thousands of troops for Operation Turquoise, after DPKO had been attempting for over a month to find troops to expand UNAMIR II, exposed the varying levels of political will to commit personnel in Rwanda. The Inquiry finds it unfortunate that the resources committed by France and other countries to Operation Turquoise could not instead have been put at the disposal of UNAMIR II.
The Secretary-General personally intervened in support of an authorisation of Operation Turquoise. The Inquiry notes that the Force Commander had sent substantive analysis of the possible problems which the operation might cause UNAMIR. One such difficulty was the perceived imbalance between the mandate of UNAMIR, which remained a Chapter VI operation throughout, and the Chapter VII authorisation given to Turquoise. To have two operations present in the same conflict area with the authorization of the Security Council but with such diverging powers was problematic.
The overlap of troop contributing countries also caused problems for UNAMIR. Indeed, on 21 June, Dallaire decided to evacuate 42 peacekeepers from francophone African States, Congo, Senegal and Togo and to replace them with United Nations personnel from Nairobi, Kenya, because of the negative reactions by the RPF caused by their participation in Operation Turquoise.
During the course of Operation Turquoise, there was on some occasions direct confrontation, or the risk of such confrontation, between the force and the RPF. As has been mentioned above, UNAMIR was asked to convey messages between the two, a role which must be considered awkward to say the least.
18. Rwanda as a member of the Security Council
The fact that Rwanda, represented by the Habyarimana government, was a member of the Security Council from January 1994 was a problem in the Security Council's handling of the Rwanda issue. In effect, one of the parties to the Arusha Peace Agreement had full access to the discussions of the Council and had the opportunity to try to influence decision-making in the Council on its own behalf. That a party to a conflict on the agenda of the Council, which was the host country of a peacekeeping operation, later subject to an arms embargo imposed by the body of which it was a member, shows the damaging effect of Rwanda's membership on the Council.
The damage was evident in the actions of the Rwandan representatives on the Security Council during this period. Both Secretariat officials and representatives of Members of the Council at the time have told the Inquiry that the Rwandan presence hampered the quality of the information that the Secretariat felt it possible to provide to the Council and the nature of the discussion in that body. (More)

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