Thai Petrochemical Industry Public Co.Lth. ("TPI") Selection of Planner

ข่าวทั่วไป Monday April 17, 2000 13:45 —PRESS RELEASE LOCAL

Bangkok--Apr.17--TPI
As a creditor of TPI, you will have recently received one or more communications from TPI and Ernst & Young ("EY") describing the proposed basis for a "Joint Planner" structure. The Steering Committee would like to provide its reasons for recommending that you do not vote for such a structure.
Under Thai law, a planner has two basic functions: one, the preparation and presentation to creditors of a plan of reorganisation for the debtor, and, two, the operation of the debtor's business during the plan preparation period.
The Steering Committee does not support the Joint Planner structure proposed by TPI and EY because:
1. It will not lead to the implementation of the Restructuring Plan contained in the Indicative Term Sheet agreed between the creditors and TPI in February 1999 and documented in the Master Restructuring Scheme (MRS); and
2. It does not give creditors sufficient comfort that they (or someone truly independent) will indeed control either the plan preparation process or the operations of TPI during the planning period.
These key issues are discussed further below.
TPI/EY plan to re-open negotiations on the terms of the Restructuring Plan
The TPI/EY team have stated that if appointed they will re-open discussions with both creditors and TPI in order to develop a new restructuring plan. The Steering Committee believes that such discussions are certain to result in an inferior plan, given the two years of exhaustive negotiations that have already taken place and TPI's ultimate unwillingness to support the original plan.
In our letter to you dated 4th April, we have already specified some of the key ways in which TPI proposes to change the original plan. In fact, in TPI's last series of comments on the MRS, which were delivered to the Steering Committee on December 1, 1999 (after having the documentation for almost two months), TPI proposed more than 70 substantive changes to the plan approved by creditors.
The only way that you as creditors can be assured that the plan you have already approved will be implemented is by voting for the Steering Committee's choice of planner, Effective Planners Limited.
The TPI/EY structure does not ensure that an independent party will control the plan preparation process or the operations of TPI
In its engagement letter of 5 April 2000, EY sets out a series of "Guiding Principles" under which it requires the Joint Planner company to operate. EY explain that these guiding principles are to be embodied in a contractual agreement between the joint venture partners and that a breach of these arrangements would give them the right to resign from their role as Joint Planner.
The Steering Committee is concerned that:
(a) it may not be legally and/or practically possible to give effect to some of these guiding principles;
(b) TPI may not adhere to the contractual arrangements with its joint planning partner; and
(c) even if the joint planner operates precisely as it is intended, EY's "control" of the planning process will be much more limited than suggested in TPI's recent communications.
If either of the concerns described in items (a) or (b) above occur, EY would have no practical remedy other than to exercise its right to resign from its position as Joint Planner. In such circumstances it is unlikely that a replacement for EY could be located within a reasonable time ( if at all). The resignation of EY would either leave TPI's appointees to the Board of the nominee planner in control of the plan preparation process (and TPI itself) or put the Joint Planner company in a position whereby it could not (because of restrictions in its memorandum and articles of association) complete its duties as Planner. Either outcome means that creditors no longer have the comfort that an independent planner remains in place.
Regarding item (c) above, despite the presence of PricewaterhouseCoopers (an accounting firm whose credentials certainly match those of EY) for over two years at TPI's corporate headquarters, their analysis of TPI's cash flow statements and budgets and their preparation of voluminous monthly reports for the Steering Committee, PricewaterhouseCoopers was ultimately unable to satisfy itself that it had an accurate and complete picture of TPI's financial and business operations. Moreover, the Steering Committee proposed (and negotiated with TPI for more than a year without ever reaching final agreement) a cash flow monitoring document strikingly similar in concept to the arrangement proposed by EY in its engagement letter for ultimate financial decision-making and control. The Steering Committee believes that EY's good intentions will meet a similar fate, if allowed to move forward.
Specific Issues from the Ernst & Young engagement letter
The guiding principles specified in the EY engagement letter with respect to which the Steering Committee has greatest concern are set out below:
(Principle) The areas of responsibility of each party to be clearly and discretely stated
Even if it is possible to clearly delineate areas of responsibility in the documents, EY has no remedy (other than to resign) if TPI exceeds its allocated authority.
(Principle) The ability of either party to frustrate the performance of the other parties duties to be minimised or eliminated.
The Steering Committee is concerned that this concept, while theoretically desirable, is not practically enforceable and may, in fact, lead to conflict within the Joint Planner structure and compromise any independence present. TPI may, for example, allege that EY is frustrating its ability to operate the business by refusing to approve a payment TPI claims is necessary. EY's only remedy in such situations would be either to resign, exposing creditors to loss of independent control of the process, or to refer the issue to a dispute resolution procedure, which is discussed below.
(Principle) A dispute resolution mechanism to be agreed to ensure that the Joint Planner can perform its statutory duties.
The Steering Committee is concerned that a formal dispute resolution process is even being proposed. TPI has proposed the Joint Planner concept on the basis that an independent party would be in ultimate control. Any need for dispute resolution (even given EY's comment that it would ultimately determine any unresolved disputes) undermines its independence and erodes any comfort that the creditors might have had that EY will be fully in control of the process.
From the most benign viewpoint, the need for EY to engage in formal dispute resolution with TPI where conflict arises will increase the cost and extend the duration of the planning process, in each case to the detriment of creditors.
(Principle) To the extent permissible by law and with the Court's approval, [EY
] will require the ability to resign if it deems it appropriate to do so. Such resignation would be as a result of a fundamental breach in the Planner Company Arrangements by the TPI representatives.
This is EY's only practical remedy if TPI does not adhere to the contract in which EY's guiding principles are specified. Unfortunately, this remedy results in creditors losing the benefit of any independent control of the planning process EY may provide and may in fact place the control of the plan preparation back in the hands of TPI.
If EY were to resign, it is unlikely that a satisfactory replacement could be found. EY states in its engagement letter that its resignation would become effective regardless of whether a replacement had been found, exposing creditors to the loss of independent control of the planning process.
The risk of resignation highlights that, in truth, EY will not have independent control.
(Principle) The Board of the Planner Company to be responsible for the issue of all reports to the creditors and the Court.
One of the major benefits available to creditors from the appointment of an independent planner is that information can be reported to the creditors freely and without interference from the debtor. The reporting mechanism proposed by EY is likely to create conflict during the preparation of reports, to slow the production of information and to adversely affect EY's ability to express its true independent views.
(Principle) Both parties will be involved in the preparation of the Plan in consultation with the creditors but under the overall direction and control of EY.
As stated above, the Steering Committee sees no merit in re-opening discussions with TPI on the terms of a new restructuring plan because it firmly believes that an inferior restructuring plan will result. EY will not control the negotiations in practice, since TPI will not allow the Joint Planner entity to propose a plan which it does not accept and may even take steps to disband or frustrate the joint planner structure before such a plan can be proposed.
(Principle) The management of TPI will handle all day to day operational matters, including the operation of the petrochemical plant, … with significant decisions determined by the Board of the Planner Company. Other matters, including payment authorisations, above certain thresholds, will require the approval of the Board of the Planner Company.
This concept is similar to the proposal of Effective Planners to retain the role of existing management in the day-to-day operations of the plant, assuming they cooperate with Effective Planners Limited (who will have absolute control). Here, however, EY is trying to divorce itself completely from any responsibility or liability for the running of the plant. Such isolation from the operations means that EY could not provide any real independent control over TPI's operating cashflows. Moreover, given the Steering Committee's experience in trying to negotiate similar payment authorisation thresholds with TPI, it is doubtful that TPI will agree to thresholds that represent any real supervision.
Conclusion and recommendation
For the above reasons, the Steering Committee considers that the Joint Planner structure proposed by TPI and EY will fail to (1) produce a plan of reorganisation acceptable to creditors and (2) control the operations of the planning process and of TPI's petrochemical complex in an effective and transparent way.
As a result, the Steering Committee does not accept the proposed TPI/EY Planner structure and strongly recommends that other creditors do not support it.
The Steering Committee urges all creditors to vote for Effective Planners Limited as the Planner of TPI at the meeting of creditors scheduled for 19 April 2000 in order to ensure that the Court Rehabilitation process is completed in a timely and professional manner and that creditors maximise their financial recovery. End.
-YK-

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