Bangkok--June 8--Fitch Rating (Thailand)
Since the election of a new government in January, there have been growing uncertainties about the direction of economic policy in Thailand. A number of ministerial statements appear to have questioned the need for ongoing market-orientated structural reforms, while a recent row over interest rate policy could harbinger major changes in the monetary policy framework. In this sovereign comment Fitch takes a closer look at the changing economic policy environment and asks what implications it may have for the outlook for Thailand’s sovereign ratings. It concludes that:
- while these are still early days, the new government has been slow in establishing a coherent macroeconomic policy framework;
- and the recent dispute over interest rate policy has undermined the credibility and transparency of the monetary policy framework. Moreover, the prospect of higher interest rates under the new central bank governor could delay the recovery;
- but reduced external debt and stronger external liquidity continue to support the ‘BBB—’ Long-term foreign currency rating, and allay any fears about external payment capacity as the trade surplus narrows;
nevertheless, with public debt now much higher than before the crisis, the scope for future policy errors is limited. Continued low growth and deteriorating asset quality in the banking system would threaten the health of the public finances and the outlook for the sovereign rating;
- in this context, it is crucial to restore the prospect of a sustained recovery by accelerating corporate restructuring, strengthening the financial system and encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI). While the establishment of the Thai Asset Management Company bodes well here, the overall message on the government’s structural reform priorities remains mixed.
Thailand’s new government has been grappling with the task of establishing a coherent macroeconomic policy framework, that is both supported by the financial markets and appeals to voters who were promised populist policies in the election campaign. This has been made harder by the fact that they have inherited a weak domestic economy in the midst of a severe external shock. A sharp slowdown in its main markets — the US, Japan and emerging Asia — has seen export growth tail off rapidly (see chart). GDP growth is expected to be just 2.5% to 3% this year, a figure that will leave activity in 2001 around 2% below its pre-crisis level (in real THB terms).
The macroeconomic policy responses it has adopted have so far received a mixed reception from investors. The government has announced fiscal stimulus measures, geared towards lower income groups whose spending patterns are judged to be more responsive to tax cuts and transfers. With the economy slowing, this will see the public sector deficit rise to over 4% of GDP, and over 5% of GDP if costs associated with financial restructuring are included. These are large deficits in historical terms and will result in further increases in public debt. The latter has increased to around 35% of GDP on a general government basis and around 55% of GDP if state enterprise debts are included. This compares with general government debt of just 5% of GDP pre-crisis. From the viewpoint of the macro economy, some fiscal easing seems appropriate and, provided growth revives fairly soon, the fiscal position should remain sustainable. Nevertheless, there is limited scope for running continuing large fiscal deficits at Thailand’s current ‘BBB+’ Long-term local currency rating level.
Monetary policy has been more contentious. In late May, the government asked the Bank of Thailand (BOT) to consider whether the low interest rate policy was still appropriate. One argument used was that the banks are placing a drag on the economy by charging wide interest margins — bank deposit rates
are currently around 2.5% to 3%, compared to lending rates of around 7ฝ% to 8% — in order to rebuild their capital. The subsequent public dispute resulted in the government removing the BOT governor.
This move has raised a number of concerns:
- firstly, the spectre of political interference in monetary policy risks damaging credibility. After the crisis, Thailand put in place a highly transparent monetary policy framework comprising an inflation target, a monetary policy board (MPB) composed of BoT officials and external experts and a quarterly Inflation Report setting out the bank’s forecasts. There were also plans to formalise the independence of the BoT. These elements were important in raising the transparency and credibility of macroeconomic policy. But they look to be in the process of being dismantled, with plans for independence shelved and suggestions that the MPB and inflation targeting may be downgraded. This would result in a lack of clarity about both the objectives of monetary policy and the decision making process. Moreover, the important disciplining mechanism that a more independent central bank places on the fiscal authorities — including through reducing the scope for monetary financing of the government deficit — would be weakened;
- secondly, higher interest rates could reduce domestic demand by encouraging saving. And, to the extent that lending rates rise, investment could weaken. (The new governor has subsequently indicated that one objective is to increase inter-bank rates, which are abnormally below retail deposit rates. While this should rectify the anomaly and benefit the large Thai banks that are net lenders to the inter-bank and money markets, it also risks leading to higher deposit and lending rates);
- thirdly, if monetary policy is tightened significantly, it would adversely affect the health of the banking sector. With the banking system still fragile, this would be worrying. Higher rates could also place additional stress on still heavily indebted firms, delaying the restructuring process.
The authorities have also placed the spotlight on the balance of payments. In particular, it has been argued that low domestic interest rates have encouraged capital outflows, which, in combination with a shrinking current account surplus have pressured the reserves and weakened the baht. Higher interest rates and other measures to restrict capital outflows have thus been put forward as a means of supporting reserves and the baht.
However, a closer look at the balance of payments raises questions about this view. In fact, as the table below shows, the major source of deterioration in the capital account last year was a slowdown in inflows of foreign direct investment. Net FDI inflows fell by nearly USD3bn in 2000 (see table below), much more a reflection of investor confidence than the level of local interest rates. There were unrecorded capital outflows of USD1พbn in 2000, but these were by no means large in an historical context and do not point to a surge in capital flight. This suggests that increases in interest rates to stem capital outflows and support the baht could meet with limited success.
Moreover, large-scale capital outflows seen in recent years have been positive from the perspective of sovereign creditworthiness. By far the largest element of the outflow has been external debt repayments by Thai banks and, to a lesser extent, companies. These have contributed to a huge reduction in Thailand’s overall net external debt from USD74bn in 1997 to USD34bn in 2000. The ratio of net external debt to export receipts has fallen to around 40%, comfortably in line with the BBB median. In addition, thanks to Thai banks having repaid large amounts of short-term external debt, Thailand’s external liquidity position has also improved. Official foreign exchange reserves of USD31bn now easily cover scheduled external amortisation payments of USD10bn in 2001 (including around USD1bn of repayments to the IMF) plus short-term external debts of under USD10bn. In fact, Thailand’s external liquidity ratio is around 140%, close to the ‘BBB’ group median.
Balance of Payments
USD bn 1998 1999 2000
Current Account 14.2 12.4 9.2
Capital account, net -10.0 -7.9 -9.5
o/w FDI 7.2 5.9 3.2
Portfolio 0.4 0.1 -0.6
o/w debt 0.0 -0.9 -1.3
Other investment -17.6 -13.9 -12.1
o/w loan repayment -10.4 -12.2 -8.5
Errors omissions -2.8 0.0 -1.7
Change in reserves 1.5 4.6 -1.9
Source: Bank of Thailand
These developments have significantly reduced Thailand’s vulnerability to an external payments crisis like that seen in 1997. This enhanced ability to pay means that Thailand’s ‘BBB—’ Long-term foreign currency rating should be robust to a near-term deterioration in the current account. Nevertheless, there are some grounds for unease on the external side, stemming from evolving policies towards the exchange rate and capital outflow restrictions.
In particular, the floating exchange rate regime has been a useful source of flexibility in the face of shocks — providing an adjustment mechanism through which a weakening exchange rate can support exports and stimulate a recovery in capital inflows. It has also lessened the risk of a drain on foreign exchange reserves in an attempt to support a peg. A reorientation of monetary policy towards fixing the level of the baht would thus imply some loss of flexibility and could result in greater interest rate volatility. The discussion of tighter restrictions on capital outflows also raises some uncertainties. Any measures will most likely be narrowly focussed on limiting the scope for speculation against the exchange rate. But, in concert with recent ambiguous statements about meeting their scheduled repayments to the IMF, the authorities are in danger of sending mixed signals about willingness to pay.
On the domestic side, the key challenge is to restore the prospect of a sustained recovery in economic growth. This will require continued progress with structural reforms, in particular accelerating corporate restructuring, strengthening bankruptcy laws, restoring the health of the financial system and improving Thailand’s competitiveness. Lack of progress in these areas could see sustained weakness in the economy and deteriorating asset quality in the banking system. With public debt — both domestic and external — now much higher than before the crisis, it would be a lot harder for Thailand to absorb a further round of fiscal support for the banks without impairing its sovereign creditworthiness.
One major achievement of the new government in the area of structural reform has been the setting up of the national Thai Asset Management Company (TAMC). This body appears similar to the centralised asset management companies (AMC’s) employed elsewhere in the region to deal with non-performing loan (NPL) problems in the banking system. However its scope has been limited to the NPL portfolios of the state-owned banks and a subset of the private banks’ NPLs. The latter include multiple creditor loans that had proved particularly hard to restructure under the previous decentralised approach. Initial transfers to TAMC will be at net book value, but the private sector banks have entered into an agreement to share losses on these portfolios at some point in the future.
The granting of special powers to the TAMC, allowing it to enforce restructuring on debtor companies, bodes well for an acceleration of corporate restructuring. The scope of the TAMC maybe more limited than centralised AMC’s in Korea and Malaysia, both of which were designated draconian powers to enforce restructuring on debtor firms. Nevertheless, TAMC has been set up with surprising speed and in a way that will limit the up-front costs to the taxpayer.
But in order for corporate restructuring to accelerate on a broader basis, it will be necessary further to strengthen bankruptcy procedures and raise the leverage of creditors in the debt workout process. Difficulties with enforcing creditor rights have been a major factor in the poor quality of corporate restructuring seen to date — with a prevalence of rescheduling rather than genuine debt restructuring — and relatively little operational restructuring. The institutional framework has also militated against mergers and acquisitions, resulting in slow pace of industrial consolidation. This has resulted in a continuing overhang of spare capacity which is weighing down on investment spending (see chart). So far, the new government has expressed a mixed commitment to these challenges and cast doubt on the need for any strengthening in creditor rights. But they clearly need to be given a strong priority.
The need to restore the financial system to health is also crucial. Banks’ non-performing loans are still around 20% of total credit and have been rising in recent months as the economy has slowed. The banking system as a whole remains inadequately capitalised and underlying profitability is poor. In these circumstances there are limited incentives for banks to take on new risks, while on the other hand, demand for new credit remains hampered by weak investment. An undercurrent of the recent interest rate debate has been that banks should be less risk averse and more pro-active in their lending policies, rather than continuing to focus on restoring their balance sheets. But a sound financial system is a prerequisite for a healthy economy.
Finally, it will also be important to reverse the recent decline in foreign direct investment inflows. As the chart shows, FDI inflows have tailed off sharply over the last year or so. This is a concern in light of longer-term threats to Thailand’s competitiveness. In particular, Thailand’s export structure is geared towards the lower end of the value-added chain, with a heavy concentration of labour intensive exports and a smaller share of technologically complex goods than, for example, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines.
Slow adoption of new technology has thus left Thailand vulnerable to loss of export market share at both ends of the product spectrum. At the low end, China is encroaching on many of Thailand’s traditional markets, while at the same time Thailand is falling further behind the hi-tech exporters in the region. Foreign direct investment could play an important role in promoting technology transfer and moving Thailand’s export sector up the value-added chain. However the tone of statements made by the new administration appears to cast doubt on the desirability of FDI.
Analyst Brian Coulton Phone + 44 20 7417 6284 [email protected] End
-NM-