Remarks by Ambassador William H.Itoh "Myths and Realities: American Perspectives on the Financial Situation in Southeast Asia"

ข่าวทั่วไป Monday November 17, 1997 19:24 —PRESS RELEASE LOCAL

Bangkok--Nov 17--U.S. Information Service
I appreciate this opportunity to meet with you today and share my thoughts about the perception and the reality of the current economic climate in Southeast Asia. I'd like to address too some of the perceptions and misperceptions abroad in the press and in the board rooms about the causes and cures of this so-called "Bahtalism."
Let me begin by reviewing the American perspective on this crisis. Our policy has been consistent. Treasury secretary Robert Rubin put it as well as anyone when he said that said that a "strong framework of policies and regulatory institutions underpin the financial sector" and that "is the key to maintaining stability."
The IMF, the World Bank and the international community all have a role to play. But real recovery, in Bob Rubin's words, depends on a nation's "sound macroeconomic policies, structural reform, financial sector reform and open market." This might sound like bitter medicine, especially to politicians, but investor confidence and investor capital will return only if the private sector is persuaded that the government is adopting correct policies. We Americans admire the remarkable accomplishments which Thailand and the other nations of the region have made over the last generation. In one generation the region has moved from poverty to prosperity, the fastest economic transformation in history. Unparalleled rates of growth, low inflation, budget surpluses, soaring exports and massive foreign investment were hallmarks of that economic miracle.
Thailand may have been slow to react to the changing circumstances and to adopt the measures necessary to revive the economy because year after year of eight percent growth rates suggested that this trend could continue indefinitely. Few key people now at the bank of Thailand, at the finance ministry or in corporate boardrooms were in positions of authority the last time Thailand experienced a full-fledged recession.
We Americans can understand all too well this reaction because there are parallels between the problems of the Thai financial sector of today and the savings and loan crisis in the United States in the 1980s. Too much easy money, a booming property bubble and too little attention from regulators cost the American taxpayer dearly. We took too long to face-up to the problems and there is a lesson to be learned from this: the longer one delays action on a financial crisis, the bigger the prie to fix it.
Causes of the current crisis
We've all heard or read some of the myths about the causes of the Thai financial difficulties and the larger regional problems since the initial float of the baht in July. Some of these theories come from the natural human tendency to look to someone or somthing as a scapegoat-- whether it is George Soros, or the new economic order, corporate greed, financial liberalization, the IMF or Uncle Sam, It is all too human to point the finger at someone else. It might make the believer feel good for a little while but every day brings reality just a little closer. Ultimately, one has to look to the real causes of the problem because that is the first step to a solution.
In my view, the roots of the present predicament facing Thailand and others in the region include none of the myths but they do include the following realities:
1. Asset inflation--especially in the stock and property markets. Stock markets soared in the early 1990s. Remember that the SET hit 1700 back in 1993? Then the market began a steady decline which became a panic in late 1996 when the level broke 1000 and has crashed into the mid-400s this year. The property glut is a principal reason for the collapse of many Thai finance companies although real estate prices have been slow to fall. If experience is any guide, however, property prices here will have to fall sharply and government will need to loosen restrictions on foreign ownership in order to break the logjam.
2. Bad debt--and more bad debt. Liquidity problems at Thai financial institutions were not a temporary phenomenon resulting from a temporary lack of confidence as was first thought. It soon became apparent that the liquidity problem was a symptom of a much greater illness. The real problem was bad debt--perhaps as much as 1.2 trillion bath--that's one point two and eleven zeros--in non-performing loans. This bad debt included property loans to be sure but also loans to non-competitive manufacturing industries. Huge amounts of foreign debt were swallowed up too by high tech plants and most of this debt was un-hedged,
3. Inadequate financial supervision became apparent already in spring 1996 in the wake of the BBC scandal. The bank of Thailand needed to reform its supervisory procedures. This became obvious to everyone as the crisis widened this year and authorities were forced to suspend 58 of 91 finance companies. Just as we Americans erred by delaying action in our savings and loan crisis, by waiting so long to close these firms, the Bank of Thailand compounded the costs to the people of Thailand. The Thai experience underscores the importance of transparency and independence of financial regulatory institutions.
4. Exports slumped to zero growth in 1996 compared to 24 percent growth in 1995. Others in the region showed less dramatic but significant declines. While Singapore and Malaysia suffered slumps in electronics, it was Thai traditional industries like textiles, leather goods, footwear furniture and seafood that led Thailand's decline. It is likely that Thailand simply priced itself out of these markets as cheaper competitors in Indonesia, Vietnam, India and China took away the markets.
5. Foreign exchange rates which many people equate with the financial crisis came late into the picture. As attractive as the pegged exchange rate was to foreign investors, it led to over-borrowing from abroad and misallocation of resources within the economy. The fact that Thailand had a fixed exchange rate since 1984 was seen as a measure of confidence in the economy. Yet as the dollar stabilized due to impressive growth in the U.S. economy, the baht seemed overvalued in reflecting the real situation in the Thai economy. By the time Thai authorities decided to float the baht it was too little too late. Thailand was already saddled with ninety billion dollars in largely un-hedged foreign debt, 70 billion of which was owned by the private sector. Traditional Thai export industries were stagnant and uncompetitive. Domestic demand was slowing. There was technical insolvency of many financial institutions. Foreign credit was drying up. Investor confidence was collapsing. Thus when the devaluation finally came it was not a panacea--far from it. But don's blame the George Soros-es of the world. Currency speculators and hedge fund operators only profit when certain economic policies are inappropriate.
U.S. policy and the IMF package
It was against this back background that Thailand began discussion with the International Monetary Fund. The IMF offered a comprehensive package designed to restore Thailand's foreign exchange reserves and to restructure the financial sector, rein in government spending and set the stage for long term reforms within the Thai economy. As you know, the United States was a driving force behind the IMF package. Treasury secretary Rubin and other Amerciacan economic and foreign policy officials strongly endorsed the 17.2 billion dollar assistance package. In addition, the United States provided indirect assistance to Thailand through our substantial participation in the IMF and World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and Bank of Internation Settlementss. Because of the accelerated procedures agreed upon by the G-7 in Halifax, these multilateral institutions and the international community were able to offer an IMF package to Thailand equal to five times the Thai quota within a matter of weeks--not monthss as in the case of Mexico. This was an unprecedented step.
President Clinton, in his recent letter to former Prime Minister Chavalit, reiterated America's pledge to work with Thailand and "international financial institutions to address Thailand's current financial difficulties." The President noted that the United States remains confident that the International Monetary Funds program "combined with the dynamism and energy of Thailand and its people, will ensure the success of this mutual endeavor."
Unfortunately, however, the IMF program did not immediately restore confidence and the reasons for this have as much to do with domestic politics as they have to do with international economics.
The United States as a major trading and investment partner of Thailand and of countries throughout the region doen more than just promote stability. In Thailand alone, American firms have invested sixteen billion dollars in industries providing more than 62,000 high- paying, secure jobs that serve as a continuing conduit for the transfer of American technology and management experience to Thailand.
Our two-way trade with Thailand totals $18.5 billion. Here too, the United States provides an indirect subsidy to the Thai economy thanks to your trade surplus with us which amounted to $4.1 billion last year and $4.9 billion the year before. The baht devaluation and contraction of Thai economy will likely see that surplus expand in 1997 and 1998. This means a major boost to the Thai economy.
Asean trade as a whole showed similar trade surpluses with the U.S. at a time when Asean and Thailand were running large deficits with other trade partners. Last year our trade with Asian and Pacific nations again provided huge surpluses to Japan ($59 billion), China ($34 billion) and Asean ($22 billion). With figures like these, it is hard to understand why there are still some people who complain about U.S. "protectionism" in the Asia-Pacific marketplace.
The United States as the World's biggest trading nation, the world's biggest, and the world's richest market will continued to be a market open to Thailand and its Asean partners. Because an open market in the long run is to everyone's benefit, we seek to promote through APEC and the WTO increased liberalization of sectorss like telecommunications and finance around the world.
Financial liberalization
Our position on WTO financial services negotiations has been widely misunderstood--another of those convenient myths perhaps. When U.S. Deputy Trade Representative Jeff Lang visited Thailand in August he explained that the United States does note favor any action that would destablize financial markets. In fact our offer explicitly invites countries like Thailand to propose an escape clause that would permit temporary suspension of liberalizing measures until circumstances are mutually acceptable. We are willing to phase in financial liberalization on an agreed-upon timetable. We think this is a reasonable position but we are pressing other countries for serious offers because we face a WTO imposed deadline for agreement in December 1997.
Just as financial liberalization did not cause Thailand's problems, neither will financial liberalization provide an instant cure for them. At the end of the day, it is up to Thailand to determine how fast it wants to open up its market. But further financial liberalization would introduce more competition, more discipline, more transparency, improved management and technology and ultimately more critically-needed capital into the Thai market.
Looking ahead
The road to full recovery will be a difficult one. The IMF has identified the way but we all know that it will not be easy. We look forward to working with the new government under Prime Minister Chuan and his impressive economic team. One of the tasks facing the new government is that of educating and persuading the Thai people that the sacrifices they must undertake wil set the stage for a more robust economy and a higher standard of living for their future and that of their children.
Having witnessed the recent struggles to bring about the process of recovery, I would offer two suggestions from an outside observer. First, it is essential that, in economics especially, officials need to speak with a single voice and agree that a decision once made must be a decision for certain. One need not think too hard to recall several recent mixed signals and reversed decisions which served only to increase domestic and international uncertainty, with devastating results on the baht and the stock market.
Second, government must listen to the private sector and the business community. In the long run, what the local business community and foreign investors think wil mean more for Thailand and southeast Asia's economic recovery than any amount of internation assistance.
If government listens to the private sector it wil hear foreign investors say that they want a revised bankruptcy law and other clear rules and regulations by which they can buy into financial institutions and other businesses.
If government listens to the domestic business community, it wil hear that they want Thailand to upgrade its infrastructure, not only telecom, transport, energy and other physical infrastructure but its human resources as well and that means greater commitment to education.
Businesses inside and outside Thailand will call for customs reform and greater transparency in government, especially in procurement contracts, privatization of state enterprises, liberalization of finance and telecom, and higher foreign equity participation.
I will conclude with a few comments about Thailand's long-term outlook. Thailand is going to make a comback. Already, Thai exports are responding to the IMF's medicine, and we can expect the current account deficit to do even better than the IMF's target of five percent of GDP this year. GDP growth this year and next will probably fall short of IMF forecasts, that is, Thailand may see little or no growth, or even go into recession, this year and next. Yet longer term, there is plenty of reason to remain positive about Thailand, and I know that U.S. business wants to be part of that future. Here are some factors to consider;
Thailand has long fostered a business-friendly open investment climate. In Asean and the WTO, Thailand is reducing trade barries. There is no national industrial policy per se in Thailand. The result is an increasing balanced economy.
Despite its well-known shortcomings, infrastructure is actualy steadily improving. Power generation, roadss, and telecom, for instance, are vastly improved compared with just a few years ago.
Thailand sits at the center of a region of vibrant growth, and is certain to benefit from the emergence of Indochina, China, and India as major new markets. Thailand's strength in what I would characterize as "mid-tech" industry, notably automoblies, electronics, and computers, will serve it very well in the future.
One thing is certainly clear from the perspective of the American Embassy and the American business community--we share a vision of Thailand's recovery and strong confidence in the long-term prospects for the Thai economy. End.

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