(ADD1) FITCH COMMENT ON ASIA NO CRISIS, BUT SLOWDOWN WILL EXPOSE VULNERABILITIES

ข่าวทั่วไป Tuesday July 31, 2001 17:56 —PRESS RELEASE LOCAL

Bangkok--July 31---Fitch Ratings (Thailand)
Asia crisis?
As exports plunge and growth forecasts are revised down sharply, the spectre has been raised of a renewed crisis in emerging Asia, just four years after the devaluation of the Thai baht sparked massive regional turmoil. Certainly, the scale of the external shock currently hitting emerging Asia - with both the US and Japan in the midst of serious downturns and the global electronics sector in lamentable shape - is greater than that preceding the 1997 crisis. But there are good reasons for believing that this will not generate the regional financial instability witnessed in 1997 and 1998 : external debt is much lower, exteranl liquidity much stronger and exchange rate regimes are, on the whole, more flexible. This increased external resilience should prevent a repeat of the widespread deterioration in sovereign external creditworthiness seen in 1997 and 1998.
Nevertheless, with economic growth having virtually ground to a halt across much of emerging Asia, ongoing domestic vulnerabilities will be exposed. These include still heavy corporate debt burdens and large overhangs of spare capacity that will weigh on investment spending and domestic demand growth. And while there is scope to apply a further round of fiscal policy stimulus in a number of countries, increases in public debt ratios since the crisis mean that the capacity to engage in this on a large--scale without iminging on sovereign ratings in limited. Moreover, the possibility of further fiscal support for Asian banking systems cannot be ruled out. Financial strengthening in most of the former crisis countries since 1998 means that systemic problems in their banking secrots are unlikely to re-emerge, but there could be further calls on the public purse to assist xome of the weaker banks in the region. Finally, there are concerns that, as policy-makers focus on restoring growth, restructuring efforts across the region could take a back seat, with adverse implications for medium-term macroeconomic performance.
In this sovereign comment, Fitch looks at how well Asia is ;laced to cope with the external shock it is currently facing and examines how the trade slowdonwn may interact with fragilities that remain in the domestic and non-traded sectors of many coutries. Focussing mainly on the former crisis countries of Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia, it concludes that foreign currency sovereign ratings across the region should be robust to the challenge, but that fiscal health could continue to deteriorate, possibly with adverse implications for local currency ratings.
External shock
Countries in emerging Asia are currently suffering a very large external demand shock, compounded by simultaneous downturns in the world's two largest economies. Exports to the US and Japan grew by 25% to 30% last year and accounted for more than 35% of total exports from developing Asia. But both Japannese and US imports have fallen in recent quarters as investment spending has contracted. This pattern is in sharp contrast to 1998, when a USD19 billion fall in developing Asia's exports to Japan was offset by a USD11bn rise in exports to the US as America's investment and consumer spending surged. The weakening in global trade has hit Asia particularly hard because of its heavy exposure to the electronics sector. Electronics products have accounted for nearly wto thirds of total exports in Malaysia and the Phililppines in recent years, and around a third in Thailand and Korea. Perhaps the clearest illustration of the extent of the decline in demand in this sector is the massive 25% fall in global semi-conductor sales since last September.
The impact of the trade sjhock on activity in Asia is proving to be severe and larger than most forecasters' initial expectations. Exports (in USD terms) across the whole region have dropped precipitously since their peak in September 2000 - down by around 10% in Thailand and Korea and 20% to 30% in Malaysia and the Philippines. A similar pattern has been seen across the region more widely, including in higher rated Singapore and Hong Kong. Interstingly, China's exports haven help up better so far, by virtue of its much lower exposure to electronics (about 15% of exports), yet even its exports have started to show a decline in recent months.
Two facotrs are amplifying the kncok-on effects from the external shock to activity in emerging Asia. Firstly, virtually all emerging Asia countries have a very high share of trade in GDP - exports of goods and services are around 50% of GDP in Korea and the phillippines, 60% in Thailand and over 120% in Malaysia. Secondly, throng intra-regional trade linkages-with many products moving through the porduction chain in several different countries before finally being exported to the US, Japan or Europe-mean that a fall in export demand in one country invevitably impacts elsewhere. IMF statistics show that some 40% of exports from developing Asian countries were exported to other developing Asian countries in 200.
Recent GDP figures reveal the breadth of the slowdown. In the first quarter of 2001
] real GDP fell in Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan, and while Korea waw a small increase, this followed a dall in 200Q4. GDP figures for the escond quarter are not yet available for these countries, but monthly indicators point to continued weakness in many and to falling activity in Malaysia. While Singapore is the only country in Asia so far to have registered a technical recessino - i.e. two consecutive quarters of falling output - it seems likely that a number of emerging Asian countries will suffer a similar fate. Conseneue forecastsfor GDP growth in 2001 as a whole are still arond 2% for most of emerging Asia (excluding China), but this will require a fairly rapid recovery in the second half of the year. With no obvious sings yet that the US slowsown has run its course, there is a significant risk of lower or even negative growth for many countries.
External resilience
The last time activity in Asia showed such an abrupt slowdown there was a virulent regional economic and financial crisis. This begs the question as to how well emerging Asia is placed to deal with the slowdown this time around ? The answer, at least on the external side,is that Asia is in a much stronger position now.
Asia crisis? July 2001
This is primarily due to much healthier external balance sheets across the region, a reflection of Asia's remarkable progress with external adjustment and debt repayment and in strengthening its external liquidity position.
The region's post-crisis current account adjustment has been truly striking. As the chart below shows,emerging Asia had a current account deficit of around USD 37 bn in 1995, broadly equivalent to Latin America's deficit.However by 1998 and 1999 this had been transformed into surpluses of more than USD100bn,driven initially by import compression and subsequently by repid export compression and subsequently by rapid export growth, which contributed to a further surplus of USD90bn last year.Moreover, even though exports of USD90bn last year. Moreover,even though exports are dropping sharply, there is a consensus that emreging Asia will continue to record current account surpluses in 2001 and 2002.This is a consensus that emerging Asia will continue to record current account surpluese in 2001 and 2002.This is a reflection both of expected repid declines in export sector itself declines - and the sheer size of trade surpluses last year.The contreat between Asia 's external dajustment during the last three years and ongoing adjustment during the last three years and ongoing extrenal deficits in Latin America- a region which has also seen its fair share of crises since 1997-is telling,and underlines the fact that Asia does not face an ceternal financing constraint.
The counterpart to emerging Asia 's corrent account surpluses has been large-scale capital outflow,and,in particular debt repayments on a massive scale. These have mostly taken the form of repayments on a massive scale.These have mostly taken ther form of repayments from Asian banks and corporates to banks outside the region. In gross terms, Thailand has managed the largest reduction in its external debt stock, with a fall of nearly USD30bn between 1997 and 2000.In netterms, Korea has seen the biggest again,with a rapid build up of foreign exchange reserves allowing it to become a significant net external creditor by the end of last year. Taken together,the five Asia crisis countries have managed to reduce their net external debt by well over USD100bn since 1997.
In addition to these improvements in external solvency ratios,emerging Asia has also seen its external liquidity position strengthen sharply.Two trends have been the driving force behing this:
repid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, most spectacularly in Korea; heavy repayments of short-term external debt,particularly in Thailand and Indonesia.
Most countries have seen a merked rebound since 1998 in the ratio of official foreign exchange reserves to external debt falling due (short and long term) in the following 12 months. For example in Korea, this ratio fell to just 11 % in 1998-as official reserves drained away and were passed to offshore branches of this ratio has increased to 125% in 2001 from just 19% in 1998. The Philippines has also seen this ratio double during the same period, to just over 100% this year. On the basis of Fitch's wider external liquidity ratio shown in the chart below (which adds in banks liquid foreign assets to the numerator and interest service plus non-resident holdings of local currency debt to the denominator), all the crises countries apart from Indonesia now have liquidity ratios well over 100%. China, Malaysia and Korea have particularly large cushions of liquidity.
The other factor that has improved emerging Asia's resilience to external shocks is the adoption, by most countries, of rather more flexible exchange rate regimes. This gives them a useful shock absorber with which to offset the impact of weaker external demand and obviates the need for interest rate increases to defend exchange rate pegs. And, of course, with the overall level of external debt much lower, there are fewer concerns about the impact of exchanges without suffering a material deterioration in sovereign external creditworthiness. By buckling down and repaying debt and rebuilding external liquidity, Asia has effectively internalised the debt problems that resulted in the 1997-98 economic and financial crisis. While this dose not mean that the underlying problems have been solved - as we external payment or liquidity crisis, It also holds Asia that has been stemming from ongoing crises in Turkey and Argentina.
Domestic vulnerabilities
However, while Asia is externally robust, the trade driven slowdown in activity could expose ongoing fragilities in the domestic and non-traded sectors of the Asian economy. In particular, the corporate debt burden remains heavy, while excess capacity continues to depress investment. These factors have weighed on domestic demand growth, which has been lacklustre in many countries since the crisis, particularly those where the corporate restructuring effort has been slow.
In contrast to the progress that has been made across the region in strengthening financial systems - which has seen banking sector capital adequacy ratios restored and non-performing loan (NPL) ratios fall sharply since 1998 - progress with corporate restructuring has been more mixed. One problem has been the prevalence of debt rescheduling rather than outright debt reduction in the restructuring process, leaving Asian Firms with high debt levels and, despite low interest rates, a fairly punitive interest service burden. A good illustration of this is Korea, where around a quarter of manufacturing firms are still unable to met interest payment from their pre-tax earnings.
Another concern has been the relative lack of operational restructuring and industrial consolidation in Asia's corporate sector. This has reflected the vagaries of the merger and acquisition process and legal obstacles that have prevented creditor banks from forcing bankruptcies or consolidation at debtor companies. As a result, there has been relatively little slimming down of production capabilities, leaving a significant overhang of spare capacity. For example, capacity utilisation rates in Thailand are currently only slightly above their 1998 trough. This has clearly been a factor behind very low investment growth in Thailand since the 1997 crisis.
As the economy slows and corporate earnings fall, Asian firms are likely to find it even harder to meet interest payment. Deteriorating corporate sector credit quality is likely to be met with attempts to cut costs, which will, in turn, put upwards pressure on unemployment and reduce household incomes. At the same time, weakening exports and a widening capacity overhang will reduce investment growth. In this context, it could prove difficult for domestic demand to take up the running from the traded sector as the driver of Asian growth.
Policy responses and risks
Monetary and fiscal authorities in the region will clearly be seeking to mitigate the downturn using macroeconomic policy levers.Greater flexibility in exchange rate regimes and a general lack of domestic inflationary regimes and a general lack of domestic inflationary pressure (notwithsstanding several months of above target inflation in Korea) means that monetary easing is easing is certainly an option for many countries. However, with demand for credit remaining low and emerging Asian financial systems already relatively abundant in liquidity, it is not clear how large an impact this will have on domestic demand. In fact exchange rate depreciation might be a more powerful way to ease monetary conditions across the region,albeit one that is currently ruled out for Malaysia.
Fiscal stimulus ought to have a stronger direct impact on domestic demand. Indeed Korea,Malaysia,China and Thailand are all in the process of implementing expansionary fiscal policies. This echoes the use of pro-active fiscal policies. This echoes the use of pro-active fiscal policies. This echoes the use of pro-active fiscal policies. This echoes the use of pro-active fiscal policies during the 1997-98 crisis (agaomst tje grain of the IMF's initial policy advice).With two notable exceptions -Indonesia and the Philippines-there clearly is scope for emerging Asian countries to engage in a further round of fiscal pump priming without running into concerns about fiscal sustainability. But the capacity to do this is more limited than it was in 1997. As the chart below shows,public debt levels have increased very sharply since 1996,reflecting fiscal loosening throughout the crisis and the cost of banking sector clean-up operations. In contrast to the position before 1997,Fitch's Asian credits can no longer be described as fiscally strong compared with their rating peers.
In combination with the slowdown in GDP growth which will reduce tax revenues and raise pressures on social safety net spending- fiscal easing will result in widening fiscal deficits and further increases in public debt ratios in the near term. Public sector contingent liabilities could also start to rise. One channel could be increasing calls on central government guarantees extended to public or private sector financial institutions and corporates. There has, for example , been a sizeable increase in such guarantees in recent year in Korea, where credit guarantee funds amounted to 15 % of GDP in 2000.
In addition,the need for some further fiscal support for emerging Asian banking systems seems likely. If the Asian corporate sector runs into fresh difficulties as the economy slows, this could translate into deteriorating asset quality and rising NPL's among Asian banks. While this may be mitigated by the fact that exporters-who are most derectly in the firing line from the region, banking sector profitability is likely to deteriorate. However, thanks to the progress made with financial sector strengthening since 1998,it seems unlikely that systemic banking crises will re-emerge in Thailand .Korea, Malaysia's banks remain under severe duress. Furthermore,there is a possibility of systemic banking problems starting to emerge in previously unaffected countries, notably Taiwan, a country where Fitch is currently in the process of assigning a sovereign rating.
In conclusion, providing the slowdown is relatively short-lived, Asia's fiscal position should remain strong enough to support current rating levels. But were the external shock to prove longer lasting - for example if US recovery in late 2001 or early 2002 fails to materialise or the yen were to weaken drastically - pressures could start to emerge. In addition, there is a risk that this cyclical downturn could divert policy makirs' attention from pressing ahead with corporate restructuring. This would harm the prospects for growth over the medium term and result in a gradusl deterioration in fiscal health. In such circumstances, emerging Asia's local currency sovereign ratings could come under pressure. End.
-AN-

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