Bangkok--Dec 6--Fitch Ratings (Thailand)
Executive Summary
East Asia's economic growth rates are slowing sharply, with regional GDP for Asia excluding Japan and China likely to be 1% in 2001 and 2-3% in 2002. For the region this slowdown is less severe than that following the 1997 crisis, when GDP growth plunged to minus 5% in 1998.
In contrast to both 1997 and to the emerging market economies of Latin America, most Asian countries have paid down debt and/or built up large foreign exchange reserves, aided by a massive swing to current account surplus over 1998-2000. Provided the global trade slowdown is not protracted, sovereign ratigns should remain relatively robust in the face of basically sound external positions. Hence, Asia has not seen a general downward trend in sovereign foreign currency ratings; indeed, there have been selective upgrades in 2001, notably Hong Kong.
While the external position is generally strong, domestic weaknesses remain in the form of fragile banking systems and vulnerable corporate sectors. The restructuring and reforms begun after the 1997 crisis are not yet complete. Domestic public debts have grown sharply, largely due to the heavy burden of supporting troubled banks. The local currency debt of the Philippines has been downgraded in 2001.
Fitch expects the asset quality of Asian banks to come under renewed downward pressure as the improvement in asset quality is reversed, but it does not expect to see a return to NPL levels of the 97/98 crisis. Problems will be more institution-specific and limited in scale.
In Korea, corporate leverage remains high and in a slowing economic environment Fitch expects the downward trend in NPLs to be reversed. The new commercial banks continue to maintain adequate financial strength and asset quality problems are likely to be concentrated in the government-linked banks and those nationalised after the 97/98 crisis. However, since their debt ratings are underpinned by ongoing government support, the ratings are not likely to change. The private sector "new" commercial banks are sufficiently strong to manage the downturn.
Thai banks, having been slow to deal with the effects of the previous crisis, remain fragile and vulnerable to any deterioration in asset quality.
Few banks there are sufficiently well capitalised to absorb further loan losses, pointing to further government-led recapitalisation schemes.
Fitch expects Malaysian banks to see a jump in the system's NPL ratio to over 20%, not only because of the slowdown, but also as previously hidden NPLs come to the surface. This will affect the shole system, with substantial losses possible for the weaker players.
Taiwan's position in the current downturn is quite different from the 97/98 crisis through which it sailed virtually unscathed. The country now faces a growing banking crisis, largely arising from internal rather than external weaknesses, with a pressing need for full recognition of potential loan losses and a plan to recapitalise weakened banks.
Despite operating in one of the world's most rapidly growing economies, banks in China have huge portfolios of NPLs. The high profile moves in recent years to remove these and to recapitalise the large banks have had little effect. Almost all banks are under-reserved and under-capitalised.
Despite the sharp economic slowdown, banks in Hong Kong and Singapore are well placed to maintain generally sound asset quality: their challenge is to maintain profitability in an environment of shringking credit demand, something that can be more readily achieved with the help of capacity reductions through consolidation. In this respect, Singapore banks have moved more decisively than those in Hong Kong, but the lateer still have the edge in terms of financial fundamentals, i.e.better profitability, asset quality and capital ratios.
Sovereign rating overview
Recent rating actions
Even before the events of 11 September, Fitch's emerging market sovereign ratings were under pressure from the slowing world economy and the emerging market crises affecting Turkey and Argentina. The downgrading of these and other countries resulted in a significant slide in sovereign ratings generally in 2001, reversing the improving trend of 2000. In contrast, the picture in Asia has been more mixed. Thile the (local currency) long-term rating of the Philippines has been Outlook has changed. There have also been upward movements, with Hong Kong being upgraded and Indonesia moveng to a Positive Outlook.
Fitch's rating actions in 2001 concerning Asian sovereigns are summarised below.
Hong Kong: Upgrade Foreign Currency to 'AA-' (Jun)
Philippines: Downgrade Local Currency to 'BBB-' (Mar)
Japan: Negative Outlook (Mar)
India: Negative Outlook (May)
Malaysia: Outlook Stable from Positive (Sep)
Indonesia: Positive Outlook (Sep)
The current list of Fitch's Asian sovereign ratings is as follows:
* Japan AA+ Negative
* Singapore AA+ Stable
* Hong Kong AA- Stable
* Taiwan -
* China A- Stable
* Korea BBB+ Stable
* Malaysia BBB Stable
* Thailand BBB- Stable
* Philippines BB+ Stable
* India BB+ Negative
* Indonesia B- Positive
Fitch's first formal rating of Taiwan will be announced shortly.
* Economic environment
The relatively limited changes to Asian ratings appears surprising in view of the oft-quoted observation that the current global slowdown will adversely affect emerging markets, especially the export-oriented economies of Asia. The weaknesses usually cited are:
* Regional growth rates cut
* Export-led recovery curtailed
* Over-exposure to the US & Japan
* Over-exposure to electronics exports
* Risk of higher oil prices
These weaknesses are certainly in evidence. The chart below shows the trend in GDP growth for emerging Asia excluding China since 1990. The slowdown expected for 2001 and 2002 represents a sharp drop in GDP growth, but not on a par with the plunge into regional recession in 1998.
There is no doubt the export-led recovery has been halted, with strong growth in exports in 1999 and 2000 reversing into declines in 2001 for most of the countries shown in Chart 2. Economic conditions in Japan and the US are crucial for Asia since these two typically account for 35-45% of exports.
As is well known, over-reliance on electronics exports is a problem for many Asian countries, led by the Philippines and Malaysia. As the chart overleaf shows, Thailand and Korea are also exposed to the same problem, as are Singapore and Taiwan, whose economic growth has fallen back sharply because of declining electronics exports.
Higher oil prices have mixed implications for Asia. They are clearly negative for the large importers, such as Korea, but are positive for Indonesia and Malaysia.
While our analysis takes account of these concerns, our relatively sanguine view of Asian sovereign credit risk is based on a much greater external resilience thanks to:
* Current account adjustment
* External debt reduction
* Rebound in external liquidity
* Competitiveness
The trend in current account balances for Asia vs Latin America is illuminating. While both regions were running deficits in the mid-1990s, they diverged sharply after 1997. with Asia racking up current account surpluses and Latin America continuing to post large deficits.
The result has been a similar divergence in levels of net external debt, with emerging Asia virtually eliminating its continued growth in debt for Latin America and a slight dip for Emerging Europe.
Of course, the aggregate figures mask differences between countries, as can be seen in the external liquidity ratio for selected Asian countries. By this measure, those countries with low debts ans large foreign assets, notably Taiwan, Chian, Hong Kong and Singapore, would score well.
If the external liquidity position of most Asian countries has strengthened enormously since the 97/98 crisis, the same cannot yet be said of their internal situation, where domestic vulnerabilities remain in their:
* Still fragile financial sectors
* Weak corporate sectors
* Deteriorating in fiscal positions
Financial systems around the region are still burdened by still troublesome levels of NPLs, and the current economic slowdown will inevitably add to these. Corporate sectors are still saddled with high leverage, weak cash folw relative to interest payments and a large overhang of spare capacity. In contrast to the strong external positions, governments have been adding to their domestic indebtedness.
As the next chart shows, the higher debt levels have been substantially driven by the cost of supporting troubled financial systems.
Sovereign Rating Conclusions:
* Foreign currency ratings robust in face of nearterm export slowdown;
* Local currency ratings less secure in face of rising public debt levels;
* Sustained export slump could lead to deteriorating credit quality across the private and public sectors, putting pressure on, sovereign, corporate and bank ratings.
In the remainder of this comment we assess Asian bank's prospects on a country by country basis.
KOREA
GDP Growth Trend: 2002E 2001E 2000 1999 1998
3.6% 2.0% 8.8% 10.9% -6.7%
Korea epitomises the rapid bounce-back of East Asia, recovering from its brush with bankruptcy at the end of 1997, when its foreign exchange reserves ran out, to net foreign creditor status in 2000.
There has also been substantial, albeit it not yet complete, progress with bank restructuring. This has involved extensive nationalisation of troubled banks, with the result that the majority of the country's banking assets are now in the hands of banks controlled by the government. Removing NPLs through write-offs, sales and transfers to the government AMC (Asset Management Company), KAMCO, has dramatically improved the asset quality across the sector.
12/00A 03/01A 06/01E
Subst+D'ful+Loss 32.0 27.7 20.3
LLR 19.5 16.6 12.1
Equity 22.1 22.8 23.5
LLR/S+D+L 60.9% 59.9% 59.6%
Net S+D+L/equity 56.5% 48.7% 34.9%
The table above shows that loans classified as Substandard, Doubtful and Loss have been declining steadily while reserve coverage has been maintained at 60%. The result is that net problem loans (S+D+L) were just 35% of the banks' equity by mid-2001. This indicates limited potential for capital loss and contrasts with a figure of over 100% that prevailed until 1999.
If this is the good news, the bad news is that Korea's loan classification system is far from perfect. The banks appear extremely reluctant to give large and influential borrowers ratings that accurately reflect their financial status, and in some cases political influence may be contributing to overly generous assessments. Hynix (formerly Hyundai Electronics) for example, was until recently classified as Normal, or Precautionary, and further provisioning is inevitable, even though reserve levels have risen substantially in 2001 to date.
The Problem of Hynix
Exposure Potential
Bank (at end- Provisions Equity loss*/
6/01) equity (%)
KEB 802 87 1673 30.7
Hanvit 810 91 2579 20.0
CHB 719 88 2264 19.9
Kookmin 409 69 4973 4.8
H&CB 167 45 3148 2.5
Shinhan 367 60 3486 6.2
KorAm 177 42 1251 7.3
Hana 182 59 1852 4.2
Source: Korea news reports
* Assumes 75% provisioning requirement
As our table shows, the Hynix problem is a big issue for Korea Exchange Bank, as it is for Hanvit adn Cho Hung. But it is of only modest significance for Kookmin, H&CB and the new commercial banks. This is representative of the broader picture for Korean banks, with the new commercial banks performing relatively well and the problems being concentrated in the nationalised banks and KEB, as our Individual ratings reflect:
Indiv. Long-term
Rating Rating
KDB, KEXIM,IBK - BBB+ (stable)
Shinhan C -
Kookmin C BBB (stable)
H&CB C -
Hana C BBB (stable)
Korea First Bank* C -
KorAm C/D BBB- (stable)
Cho Hung* D BBB- (stable)
Hanvit* D BBB- (stable)
KEB D/E BBB- (stable)
Seoul Bank* D/E - (stable)
* KFB, Hanvit, Cho Hung and Seoul Bank were nationalised following the 97/98 crisis. KFB has been subsequently privatised. KEB was, and is, indirectly partly government owned.
Despite the banks' differing financial strength, our Long-term ratings are on more of a par because of the importance of government support. All these banks enjoy actual or potential support from the authorities, should it be needed, which underpins the debt ratings of the financially weaker banks. We will need to see an improvement in these banks' stand-alone financial strength before we see any improvement in their debt ratings.
While the financial strength of Korean banks has rebounded enormously since the crisis, the trend has slowed and is likely to be reversed for the short-term.
In the chart below we show NPLs at June 2001 and reserve coverage levels.
NPLs Reserves/NPLs.
Shinhan 2.7% 67%
H&CB 4.0% 57%
Kookmin 5.4% 58%
Hana 3.9% 58%
Korea First Bank 11.0% n.a.
KorAm 6.7% 75%
Cho Hung 5.8% 60%
Hanvit 7.7% 80%
KEB 4.7% 80%
Seoul Bank 8.6% n.a.
* NB: KFB has a "put option" to sell most of its NPLs to the government.
The relatively low level of NPLs and high reserves have been helped by large-scale loan write-offs and disposals in 2001. However, to see the full picture we would need to add in Hynix and NPLs likely to arise from the inpending economic slowdown. We also recognise that the slowing economy will cause problems for Korea's still highly indebted corporate sector. Assuming this adds NPLs to over 12% of total lending for Cho Hung, Hanvit, KEB and Seoul Bank, with our more highly rated banks remaining is single digits. (This is on a gross basis; the net figure may be lower if banks make aggressive moves to write-off or sell loans.)
This suggests that the healthier banks (from shinhan to KorAm in the above list) should be able to maintain their reasonably sound financial profiles and continue to report profits, while the lower rated four are more vulnerable to losses. Even so, we do not expect these banks to revisit the depths of the 97/98 crisis and their debt ratings will be stable as long as government support remains strong. Even their privatisation is unlikely to change our Support ratings since our expectation of government support for banks such as Hanvit is based on its market share and importance to the domestic economy, which would not change irrespective of who owns the bank. (MORE)
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