Bangkok--Dec 6--Fitch Ratings (Thailand)
MALAYSIA
GDP Growth Trend: 2002E 2001E 2000 1999 1998
3.5% 0.0% 8.3% 6.1% -7.4%
After initial criticism of the imposition of foreign exchange controls in September 1998, Malaysia has generally earned positive appraisals for its return to growth and moves to restore the banking system to reasonable health. More recently, concerns have been voiced over the fixed exchange rate, political risk and the real health of the corporate and banking sectors.
For our sovereign rating the key is the modest external debt and high level of foreign exchange reserves. Malaysia boasts exceptionally strong external liquidity ratios for a 'BBB' rated country. Weaknesses are reliance on electronics exports, some risk of excessive fiscal pump-priming and concerns over the exchange rate regime. These issues led us to bring the Rating Outlook in September back to Stable from the positive trend implied by the financial data.
Malaysia's widely applauded progress with financial reforms reflects two key developments: the large-scale purchase of NPLs by the government-backed AMC, Danaharta, and the dramatic consolidation that has seen the 54 banks, merchant banks and finance companies coalesce into (at present) 11 group.
The effects of the government's intervention can be seen in the chart above. The disposals to Danaharta kept the system's NPLs at around 15% of gross lending instead of rising to in excess of 25%. The banks took losses on these disposals, which for some meant capital injections by another government body, Danamodal, were required.
Thanks to Danaharta and a sharp pick-up in GDP growth, NPLs declined in 1999 and 2000, though at a somewhat desappointingly slow pace. In the first seven months of 2001 there was a notable increase in NPLs due largely to the banks finally classifying certain loans granted to some of Malaysia's largest corporates as, in fact, non-performing. Prior to May of this year, these had been categorised by the banks as performing under a special dispensation granted by the central bank as an inducement to restructure such loans.
A further marked rise in NPLs over the rest of this year is expected due to the restructuring of certain other large corporate loans coming undone as the companies involved find themselves unable to off-load certain assets because unfavoruable markets-in particular the equity and property markets. In fact, the central bank governor has stated that such facilities will add three percentage points onto the system-wide NPL ratio - i.e. taking it from just on 16% at end-July to just on 19%
Beyond this, there is much concern that NPLs in Malaysia will climb this year as a result of the slowing global and domestic economies. We initially expected NPLs in Malaysea to peak at around 21% in the first half of next year, but this figure is now likely to rise and we are therefore now working on a "worst case" 24% NPL ratio, having conducted a stress test for the individual banks, taking as our starting point their existing asset quality levels. The results are shown in the chart.
It is no surprise to see that Public Bank remains exceptionally sound even after the write-offs. Maybank, by contrast, is closer to the middle tier of RHB and BCB (Bumiputra Commerce Bank) than we would have initially expected, though this group should be able to cope with the potential losses. Greater losses are likely for Affin, the Arab Malaysian Group and Alliance Bank. Maybank's formerly strong balance sheet has been somewhat weakened by its acquisition of less sound banks.
Our Individual ratings of Malaysian banks are as follows:
Maybank B/C
Public Bank B/C
RHB Bank C
BCB C/D
Southern Bank C/D(s)
Bank Utama D(s)
Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank D
Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank D/E
Affin Bank D/E
The scenario analysis above suggests that some Individual ratings may have to be lowered. We will be monitoring the performance and, more especially, the asset quality of the individual banks to see how they are being affected by the weaker economic environment.
THAILAND
GDP Growth Trend: 2002E 2001E 2000 1999 1998
2.5% 1.2% 4.4% 4.2% -10.8%
Thailand experienced the largest reduction in gross external debt of any of the Asia crisis countries over 1998-2001. And with short term external debt reduced dramatically and foreign exchange reserves replenished, external liquidity has rebounded. But these external improvements have been offset by domestic weaknesses, including slow progress with corporate restructuring, leaving a heavy corporate debt burden and a large overhang of excess capacity. The policy environment has also been a cause for concern, with the new administration slow to establish a coherent macroeconomic policy framework. The sacking of the central bank governor and increase in interest rates in June have raised questions about the monetary policy framework, while there are also some doubts about commitment to structural reforms set in train under the 1998-2000 IMF programme.
As shown in the chart above, there was a very substatial reduction in Thai bank's NPLs in 2000 as they continued to fall back from the peak of well over 60% of gross lending reported after the 97/98 crisis, and on a combined basis halved from 40% of gross loans at end-1999 to 20% at end-2000. The key drivers were Krung Thai Bank (the government removed the bulk of its NPLs) and Bangkok Bank, which took advantage of an earlier build-up of reserves and capital to write-off its bad loans. The smaller Bank of Asia and DBS Thai Danu received help from their foreign parents which injected capital enabling them to write-off or sell bad loans.
It is of note that in the first half of this year, however, there was no great improvement in any of the bank's NPLs. Indeed, in some cases they saw a deterioration as the Thai economy once again began to slow, a trend that is expected to continue for the next year or so. Given this, and the banks, we would expect a good portion of them will ultimately have to be written-off.
Will these banks actually be able to make such writeoffs? The next chart shows our estimates of the effect of writing-off 70% of remaining NPLs.
We assume loss rates will be high on the remaining rump of NPLs after the more viable borrowers have had their loans restructured. In aggregate, the bank's loan loss reserves and Tier I and Tier II capital is almost entirely wiped out by the losses. The worst affected would be Bank of Ayudya, Thai Military Bank and Bank of Asia. But even the other, stronger banks look very fragile by this measure, the only one in a reasonably healthy position is DBS Thai Danu.
Hence, our assessment is that the Thai banks still in private hands are not well placed to handle a further deterioration in asset quality. The implications are that if these banks are to recognise the losses, then the govenment is going to have to put in more money (up to THB150 bln) to recapitalise them.
The newly established Thai Asset Management Corporation, or TAMC, may be of some, although at this stage it seems very limited, assistance. The latest plan is that the TAMC will only buy certain large syndicated loans from the banks, while these equate to 20% of NPLs, will only be sold to the TAMC at their written-down value. If such written-down values are overstaed, the banks may be required to make futher write-downs before the loans are acquired. And if the TAMC ultimately makes a loss on a loan, there is considerable recourse back to the banks. Moreover, the bonds which the TAMC will issue to the banks in exchange for the loans will carry interest equal only to the cost of funds of the country's major banks. As such, the banks will not make a profit on the bond. In factm, the smaller, weaker banks may well make slight losses as they have an above average cost of funds. This, however, would be preferable to nil level of interest they are currently receiving on the NPLs.
Over the longer-term, the TAMC may facilitate the restrcturing of Thailand's larger corporates, which ultimately will be a good thing for the banks. In the more immediate-term, however, the TAMC is unlikely to offer any substantial relief.
Our Individual ratings for Thai banks remain at the bottom of the scale and little upward movement is expected given the prospects outlined above.
Indiv LT FC
Rating Rating
Bangkok Bank D/E BB+(Stable)
Thai Farmers D BB+(Stable)
Krung Thai D/E BB+(Stable)
Siam Commercial D/E BB+(Stable)
Thai Military D/E BB-(Stable)
Bank of Ayudhya E B+ (neg)
Bank of Asia* D/E BBB-(Stable)
DBS Thai Danu D -
The Long-term ratings are premised on support from the Thai govenment in the case of the Big Four bank and from ABN AMRO in the case of Bank of Asia. As long as this support remains strong and the sovereign rating unchaged, the debt ratings of these banks will be stable. The lower debt ratings of Thai Military Bank and Bank of Ayudhya reflect their smaller size and systemic importance, which results in a slightly lower expectation of support than for the Big Four.
THE PHILIPPINES
GDP Growth Trend: 2002E 2001E 2000 1999 1998
2.7% 2.5% 4.0% 3.3% -0.6%
The key concerns for Philippines are its poor fiscal track record, high public debt, significant exposure to the US and reliance on electronics exports. Added to these concerns is the steady deterioration in bank's asset quality.
System-wide NPLs stood at just over 10% at end-1998, far below the crisis countries of Indonesia (70%), Thailand (40%) or even Malaysia (20%). However, this figure had grown steadily ot 15% by end-2000 following the Estrada impeachment and subsequent political uncertainty. Since this was followed by the global economic slowdown, NPLs in the Philippines are now around 18% compared to Malaysia's 16% Thailand's 20% and Indonesia's 17% Going forward, Fitch believes that NPLs in the Philippines will continue to increase until mid-2002 when they will peak around 23%
On the surface, Philipine banks appear to be in a more comfortable position than aforementioned countries' banks due to above average loan loss reserves and capital. Despite the high level of NPLs, the ratio of net NPLs/equity of the country's major banks at end-2001 was 40%, indicating problematic, but not disastrous, asset quality.
Howerver, this is not the whole story as Philippine banks have substantial restructured loans and ROPOA - Real Estate and other Properties Owned and Acquired - essentially foreclosed collateral. Once this is added in, the impaired loan ratio rises to 33% and the net impaired assets/equity ratio to 89%.
In the above chart we conduct a stress test that assumes a worst case write-off of 70% of NPLs and 30% of the ROPOA (which in theory has already been written-down to realisable value). Most banks can still maintain an equity assets ratio of over 5% which should enable them to achieve CARs of over 8%. As expected, Bank of the Philippine Islands and Chian Banking Corp come out the strongest, while Philippine National and United Coconut Planters are particularly weak. Land Bank and Rizal also appear somewhat weak, but overall, the system in aggregate looks to be still just adequately capitalised.
This more severe asset quality picture explains our relatively low Individual ratings, even for the healthier banks.
BPI C
Union Bank C/D(s)
Banco de Oro C/D
Metrobank D
Equitable PCI D
Rizal D (s)
United Coconut Planters D/E(s)
Philippine National Bank E
TAIWAN
GDP Growth Trend: 2002E 2001E 2000 1999 1998
2.2% -1.5% 6.0% 5.4% 4.6%
Fitch has not yet assigned a sovereign rating to Taiwan but plans to do so by year-end.
The key issues are similar to those of Hong Kong to the extent that very strong financial fundamentals (low debt and sizeable foreign assets) are offset by political considerations. Arguable, these are now less significant in the case of Hong Kong, which has a settled relationship with the People's Republic of China, while Taiwan does not.
Beyond the political concerns, Taiwan has some specific problems that Hong Kong does not: notably an extremely weak banking system. Indeed, noe that is sliding rapidly towards a crisis.
NPLs have grown inexorably in recent years but loan loss reserves have not kept pace. Banks have been reluctant to add reserves beyond the levels allowable for tax relief, and regulators and auditors have not pressured them to do so. Traditional reliance on real estate collateral that has historically resen in value is the main reason for this complacency. The result is low levels of reserves and high levels of net (unreserved) NPLs to equity.
Official Non-Performing Loans
12/2000 03/2001 06/2001
180 days overdue 773.5 842.3 929.1
Restructured loans 223.0 233.1 262.9
90-180 days overdue 203.3 232.4 230.9
Official NPLs 1,199.8 1,307.8 1,422.9
Total loans 14,474.6 14,307.7 14,460.9
Official NPL(%) 8.29% 9.14% 9.91%
Loan loss reserves 175.6 177.8 192.6
Net NPLs/Equity 64.0% 69.6% 76.4%
As we believe that Taiwanese banks will need to realise losses on their portfolios as valuations are forced more in line with reality and provisioning livels will need to rise to compensate, we have estmated the likely cost to the system. Our estimate is that system-wide NPLs will rise to 20% of loans in the next 12 months. Under this scenario, the equity/assets ratio of Taiwanses banks will be cut to almost zero.
It would also take up to three yesrs of current pre provisioning operating profits for the banks to recognise related losses and work through these problems themselves.
It should be stressed that the costs to the country are certainly manageable. Under our estmates, it would take 5-10% of Taiwan's GDP to write-off NPLs, reduce the asset quality pressures to acceptable levels and assure sufficient capitalisation.
The problems are of course not evenly spreas throughout the system but rather are concentrated in certain "pockets", mostly the wholly or partially government-owned banks, of which Taiwan has an excess. The picture is not entirely clear-cut, however, as some of the new private commercial banks have done badly, while Chiao Tung, ICBC and TaipeiBank among the government-related banks have done relatively well. The financial well-being of bank is reflected in our Individual ratings, most of which now fall into two clearly diverging groups. The members of the healthier group are rated B/C or C and the banks suffering the worst of the bad bebt problem are rated between D and E. (MORE)
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