(ADD2) ASIAN SOVEREIGN AND BANK RATING OUTLOOK 2001

ข่าวทั่วไป Thursday December 6, 2001 12:00 —PRESS RELEASE LOCAL

Bangkok--Dec 6--Fitch Ratings (Thailand)
CHINA
GDP Growth Trend: 2002E 2001E 2000 1999 1998
6.7% 7.0% 8.0% 7.1% 7.8%
Our sovereign rating of China is influenced by two divergent factors: the exceptionally strong external position, with China maintaining large, liquid external assets, and the chronically weak domestic state-owned enterprises, including the banks.
As the chart above shows, the external position has improved in recent years, but the same cannot be said of the financial sector. Although transparency is extremely poor, the data available on Chinese banks' asset quality is extremely negative.
End-2000(%) Impaired Loan loss Net
loans ratio reserves/ impaired
Impaired loans/
loans Equity
Bank of China 28.9 8.02 221.70
Ind'I & Comm Bank of China 25.1 17.27 300.00
China Construction Bank 15.7 4.88 170.00
Agricultural Bank of China 35.0 2.56 376.00
Bank of Communications 18.0 12.80 143.00
China Everbright Bank 24.8 4.33 187.40
China Merchants Bank 10.8 2.37 99.60
China Minsheng Bank 4.2 30.64 17.70
Shanghai Pudong Dev Bank 11.2 42.80 57.40
The large banks still carry very high levels of NPLs, even after transferring a substantial amount of bad loans to their respective AMCs. Loan loss reserve coverage is low and net (unreserved) NPLs very high in relation to equity, making all the banks potentially insolvent, some several times over. Not all publish data, but we doubt that any of the "Big Four" are in much better shape than Bank of China, which reports an NPL ratio of 29%.
While it has long been recognised that the stateowned bank have problems on this scalem it comes as more of a surprise to find that even the new commercial bank have accumulated large bad debts that threaten their solvency.
The result is that our Individual ratings of Chinese banks are mostly 'D/E' and 'E',indicating that the system is effectively insolvent. In Fitch's view there are two possible scenarios to rectify this. First, the government could force banks to recognise the losses and make appropriate reserves and write-offs, which would necessitate it making large-scale capital injections. We think this is unlikely and the Chinese will choose the second option of growing out of the bad debt problem. With nominal GDP growth of 7-8% Chinese banks can look forward to rapid rates of loan growth which could dilute the NPL problem so that over time losses become manageable. The key, of course, is that the new loans must be better quality than the old. This in turn requires that risk management systems are more effective than in the past.
If the banks did decide to tackle the problems immediately, the scale of the losses would overwhelm their capital and the cost to the public purse would be substantial. This is true even if we assume a base level of 25% NPLs (the reality is likely to be higher) and a low-end loss rate of 40%, equating to 7% of GDP. This rises to 22% of GDP if we add in the NPLs transferred to the AMCs, as these remain a contingent liability for the government (and possibly for the banks as it is not clear whether the sales were completely without recourse).
End-2000 in CNY bln Loss Rate @
40% 60% 80%
Total NPLs 1,633
Expected loss 653.2 979.8 1,306.4
Loan loss reserves 56
Net loss -596.8 -923.4 -1,250.0
Total capital 600
Net loss/Capital 99.5% 153.9% 208.4%
2000 GDP 8,940
Net loss/GDP 6.7% 10.3% 14.0%
Net loss/GDP (including
NPLs transferred to 22.3% 26.0% 29.6%
AMCs)
Our analysis of Chinese banks suggests that risk control is improving but is not yet at a level that can adequately manage the risks inherent in rapidly growing loan portfolios in an economy in transition. We therefore expect China's banking system to remain weak and very vulnerable to any slowdown in the local economy. China's accession to the WTO will not have a great impact for some years given the grace period during which the banks will be protected from foreign competition.
HONG KONG
GDP Growth Trend: 2002E 2001E 2000 1999 1998
2.3% 0.0% 10.5% 3.0% -5.3%
Hong Kong's sovereign rating was raised from 'A+' to 'AA-' in June 2001, bringing it closer into line with the rating level implied by its very strong financial position. The rating is constrained by Hong Kong's relationship with the People's Republic of China, but we concluded that as the "one country, two systems" had worked sufficiently well since 1997, it was appropriate for us to widen the differential between the two ratings. This being the case, it is unlikely that Hong Kong's rating will be lowered even as its economy undergoes a period of weakness.
One of the strengths of Hong Kong is its Hong Kong is its financial system, with a banking sector that enjoys prudent management, competent supervision and boasts very strong financial fundamentals, which saw the system through the 97/98 crisis to emerge relatively unscathed.
As the chart above shows, system Classified Loans peaked at over 10% in 1999, though loans actually overdue were less than this. The impact on the banking system was, in retrospect, surprisingly mild. Net losses reported by some smaller banks was the worst it got. There were no bank failures. Since then the asset quality picture has improved steadily. Until 2001 that is, when the prospects have been dampened significantly. The key issues are:
* reaker economic growth
* rising unemployment
* a depressed property market
* narrowing interest margins on mortgage lending.
The gloomy economic environment will undoubtedly lead to higher NPLs and loan losses in the short-term. However, we expect the effects to be limited and to see overdue loans remain in single digits.
Of greater concern is the medium- to long-term. The depressed property market is a major negative for Hong Kong's economy, with no sign of recovery despite record low interest rates. Fears of unemployment are deterring home buyers, but a more fundamental deterrent remains in the negative trend in inflation. A deflationary environment is clearly not conducive to the heavy gearing up needed to buy properties in Hong Kong.
It is, therefore, hard to predict a return to buoyant growth in Hong Kong. The banking system is sound, profitable and well-capitalised. The challenge is to maintain these strengths against the pressures of economic weakness and stagnant loan demand. If banks are successful, their ratings will remain stable; if they are not, then downward adjustments will be made.
SINGAPORE
GDP Growth Trend: 2002E 2001E 2000 1999 1998
0.0% -3.5% 9.9% 5.9% 0.1%
At 'AA+' with a Stable Outlook, Singapore enjoys the highest sovereign rating in Asia. Given its exceptionally strong domestic and external debt position, this is not likely to change, despite the unexpectedly severe downturn in GKP growth in 2001. The final figure is in fact likely to be lower than in 1998 when Singapore just managed to avoid a recession.
Does this imply that the asset quality of the banks is likely to deteriorate further than it did following the 1997/1998 crisis? This would be a concern, since the NPLs of Singapore banks reached surprisingly high livels at that time-see chart overleaf.
One reason for the high level of NPLs was regional loan exposures: in Thailand in the case of DBS, Malaysia for OCBC, UOB and OUB, and Indonesia (via syndicated lending) for Keppel Tat Lee. DBS has disposed of most of the problem loans of Thai Danu, which contributed to the sharp drop in its NPLs. UOB has maintained well above average asset quality, having limited its exposure to the more troubled areas of Singapore corporates, notaby real estate-related. This was a bigger problem for OCBC, whose loan portfolio management was tightedned, along with widespread improvements in credit risk management introduced by Alex Au following his appointment as CEO in 1998.
We do not expect the weak GDP figures to substantially push up banks' NPLs, though clearly there will be some adverse effects. The reason is that Singapore's economy is heavily influenced by exports, especially electronics, which are produced by locally-based multi-national corporations. Their production levels and financing are somewhat detached from the domestic economy and do not directly affect lending volumes or quality.
Of greater concern is the deterioration in Malaysian asset quality discussed above. Both UOB and OCBC have sizeable operations in Malaysia that have been a significant source of NPLs.
As the above chart shows, additional classified loans could push NPL ratios back over 12% for OCBC and back up toward 10% for DBS and UOB. This would cost the banks some loss of earnings, which would have to be devoted to loan losses, but would not be materially damaging. As can be seen in the chart above, OCBC survived a surge in NPLs to over 14% in 1999. It also has large hidden reserves it could tap if necessary. In the unlikely event that profits were not sufficient to cover loan losses and the banks incurred net losses, their capital position would remain strong, though they are no longer reporting extraordinarily high Tier 1 ratios of over 20%.
Our Long-term rating of DBS of 'AA-' is currently on Negative Outlook pending a restoration of its capital position following the Dao Heng acquisition. The Outlook for OCBC is Stable, at 'A+', the lower rating mainly reflecting its higher level of NPLs. The Outlook for UOB's A+ Long-tem rating is positive, reflecting its good record of above average financial ratios compared with its very solid peer group. We take the view that consolidation in the sector in Singapore is beneficial to the surviving banks whose profitability should be enhanced through cost-cutting and improved profit margins after 40% of the local banks (by number) have been eliminated in the current round of consolidation. This positive outlook will be sustained only if the deterioration in asset quality is slight.
INDONESIA
GDP Growth Trend: 2002E 2001E 2000 1999 1998
3.5% 3.0% 4.8% 0.8% -13.1%
In its high levels of domestic and foreign debt, Indonesia differs from its Asian peers and has more in common with the Latin American peer group. It has also experienced acute political problems and a dramatic collapse in its currency following the 1997 crisis.
The more stable political environment since Megawati assumed the presidency offered the potential for a better economic performance and an improved fiscal position, factors that led us to place a Positive Outlook on our Long-term 'B-' rating in September 2001.
Indonesia's banking system has similarly emerged from a period of stress, and having reached the bottom of our Individual rating scale, its banks are now poised for a slow and uncertain recovery.
The key factor that will determine their fates is balance sheet structure. Somewhat paradoxically, some of those banks that performed most disastrously during the crisis now have the cleanest balance sheets and the best prfit potential. This is simply because they have few loans, most of their balance sheet consisting of government bonds that they received in exchange for their NPLs. But the nature of those bonds is crucial: banks that received floating rate bonds are doing well, being able to maintain good profit margins. Those that received fixed-rate loans yielding 12% are struggling given that time deposits pay interest rates well above this.
Our current Individual ratings of Indonesian banks give highest marks to those that have the cleanest balance sheets, i.e.few loans, or low NPLs for those banks that retained a more meaningful loan book, and floating rate government bonds. But even these banks are rated at best 'C/D'. Almost all are, in a sense, simply shells of banks that need to rebuild their loan books in order to build a base of earning assets. Given their past tendency towards related party lending and generally poor loan underwriting standards, their ability to build healthy and remunerative loan books must remain questionable. Assessing their credit risk management skills will be a key part of our future analysis. But for the time being, the bank's ratings are constrained by their own distorted balance sheet structures and Indonesia's still low sovereign rating.
Contact:
Brian Coulton:Sovereign Tel:+44(0) 207 417 6284
Paul Rawkins:Sovereign (0) 207 417 4239
Therese Feng Sovereign +12129080500
David Marshall:Banks +85229736293
Arthur Lau:Banks
Paul Grela:Banks
Roxanne Liu, Banks
Ambreesh Srivastava:Banks +653366801
Peter Tebbutt
Vincent Milton +662 655 4759
Fitch Ratings Ltd has used due care in the preparation of this document. Our information has been obtained from sources we consider to be reliable but its accuracy or completeness is not guaranteed. Fitch Ratings Ltd shall owe no liability whatsoever to any person for any loss or damage caused by or resulting from any error in such information. None of the information in this document may be copied or otherwise reproduced, stored or disseminated in whole or in part in any form or by any means whatsoever by any person without Fitch Ratings Ltd's prior written consent. Our reports and ratings constitute opinions, not recommendations to buy or to sell.
Tel: +44(0)20 7417 4222 Fax:+44(0)20 7417 4242 www.fitchratings.com End
-NM-

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